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Abstract: Corporate disclosure is a key mechanism of corporate governance. This study examined 
the effect of corporate governance disclosure (CGD) on the financial performance of commercial 
banks listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange. Based on the provisions of the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria, 2011 and the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks 
and Discount Houses 2014, the study developed a disclosure checklist and employed content analysis 
technique to extract corporate governance (CG) from 78 annual reports of 13 Nigerian commercial 
banks from 2011 to 2016. The study trichotomized CGD into those relating to the board of directors, 
risk framework, and whistleblowing policy. The results of the hypothesized relationships showed a 
positive and significant association between CGD and the banks' financial performance, with a 
positive effect of CGD on the board of directors and whistleblowing policy. However, the study did 
not find a significant association between CGD of risk management framework and the banks' 
financial performance. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a broader 
understanding of the effect of CGD on banks' financial performance. The development of a disclosure 
checklist based on the regulators’ codes of corporate governance is a useful addition to the literature. 
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Nigerian Banks; Nigeria. 
JEL codes: G3; G30 
 
1. Introduction 
Very few topics have elicited as much consensus in national and international business 
conversations as corporate governance. Over the years, there has been a concerted interest around the 
world in promoting good governance in corporate organizations and Governments, and public-sector 
agencies. Good corporate performance is typically associated with accountable and transparent 
governance structure or good government with accountable and transparent systems of political and 
economic governance. The history of corporate governance proceeded from a global concern for more 
efficient management of publicly quoted (listed) companies in the face of growing concerns about 
inadequate protection of shareholders' rights and interests by corporate management. Another global 
trigger was the ostensible apathy of large corporate organizations towards wider stakeholder interests 
(that is, beyond shareholder wealth maximization) amidst growing anxieties about the failure of 
corporate social responsibility and environmental concerns. Recent corporate scandals and failures 
have attracted mainstream interest in the wake of economic crises as policymakers, business leaders 
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and the general public comprehend the economic consequences of incomplete or inadequate 
disclosure of information in corporate financial reports. While there has been a flurry of a national and 
global regulation to mitigate the scourge, the prudential measures have, nevertheless, not gained much 
mileage in stemming the tide of the harmful impact of fraudulent corporate governance disclosure on 
the stability of systemically important corporations.  
Corporate governance is the institution of structures, processes, and rules that guide and ensure 
that organizations are properly managed to the benefit of all stakeholders. It is about maintaining an 
appropriate balance of accountability among three key players: the owners of the company (as 
principals), company executives (employed as the owners’ agents - the directors/managers), and the 
company executives and third parties, including other stakeholders. 1  This characterization is 
somewhat different from that of Shrivastav and Kalsie (2017). Effective corporate governance provides 
corporate stability which, in turn, supports economic progress and development. In well-governed 
entities, directors (and managers) exhibit competence and care, financial propriety, honesty and 
integrity, transparency and accountability, adherence to good ethical standards and relevant laws, 
regulations, and policies, and commitment to enhancing shareholders' value and protection of 
interests of stakeholders. Corporate governance is dynamic and constantly looking for new rules and 
regulations, structures, and practices for the benefit of all stakeholders. The involvement of boards is 
to ensure that truly good and progressive governance subsists to instill ethical standards and best 
practices that add corporate value and prevent or minimize corporate infractions.  
Several national and multilateral organizations have weighed in with their positions on corporate 
governance in the wake of the spate of recent corporate financial scandals and collapses which 
necessitated a coordinated global response to improvements in the quality of corporate governance 
architecture and associated disclosure. Important multilateral agencies that both identified and offered 
global insights into corporate governance deficits include the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) (1999, 2004), UNCTAD (2003), World Economic Forum (WEF) (2003), and 
UN Global Compact (UNGC) (2009). For example, in arriving at its consensus of what constitutes good 
corporate governance, published as 'elements of corporate governance, the OECD scanned the views 
of stakeholders from many different countries. The OECD canvasses the view that "the primary role 
for regulation is to shape a corporate governance environment compatible with societal values that 
allows competition and market forces to work so that corporations can succeed in generating a long-
term economic gain. Specific governance structures or practices will not necessarily fit all companies 
at all times" (OECD, 1999, 2004). The OECD identified seven (7) key elements of good corporate 
governance as (i) the rights and obligations of shareholders; (ii) equitable treatment of shareholders; 
(iii)·the role of stakeholders and corporate governance; (iv)·transparency, disclosure of information 
and audit; (v) the board of directors; (vi)·non-executive members of the board; (vii)·executive 
management, compensation and performance (OECD, 1999, 2004). 
Corporate governance issues do not arise in a vacuum. Rather, they stem from an identifiable 
process. Contemporary corporate governance is traceable to the UK Cadbury Report of 1992. The 
Cadbury Committee, named after its chairman, Adrian Cadbury, was established in May 1991 sequel 
to several high-profile corporate collapses. The primary mandate of the Committee was to evolve 
mechanisms to protect weak and widely dispersed shareholders against the opportunistic proclivity 
of directors and managers. Corporate governance is architected on four fundamental pillars of agency-
related concern: (a) the increasing lack of investor confidence in the managerial stewardship (honesty 
and accountability deficit) of listed companies; (b) financial collapses of public corporations; (c) the 
negligence of auditors cum lack of faithful representation of facts in audited accounts and the potential 
loss of a self-regulatory role of auditors; and (d) lack of board's accountability over such matters as 
directors' remuneration (See: Cadbury, 1990, 2000).  
                                                 
1“Stakeholder groups are by definition those that have something at stake in the organization, operational activities, subsistence, 
and/or collapse/failure of the organization. … Although the nature and size of stakes may vary considerably from the company 
(group) to company (group), the existence of stake per se is sufficient to warrant a particular stakeholder group in an open 
society to expect and receive the opportunity to provide input into or interrogate activities that affect or potentially affect it and 
to exert some control for the group's overall interest" (Herbert, 1996; Herbert, Nwaorgu, Onyilo, and Iormbagah, 2020). 
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These concerns gravitate to a failure to attenuate the schism between shareholders and directors 
(shareholders' representatives responsible for setting policies, strategies, and governance systems and 
overseeing management) and managers (who implement board policies). The involvement relations 
of corporate governance are the triad of shareholders and the ownership pattern, directors and the 
board composition, and management, in the order of the principal-agent model. These principal actors, 
their interests, and interactions are embedded in what is known as the ‘corporate governance triangle’ 
(EWMI/PFS Program, 2005). Both insightful analyses and public perceptions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) suggest the prevalence of governance deficit in public and private sectors, where officials 
commit flagrant breaches of public trust through opacity in governance and contract awards and 
opportunistic procurement of public works and services. Poor governance attenuates the institutional 
capacity of organizations, hamper performance, distort and weaken markets, and impede economic 
development, trade, and investment.  
A review of the disclosure literature indicates a heavy focus of prior studies on the determinants 
of disclosures (Wallace, Naser, and Mora, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansa, 1998; Bujaki 
and McConomy, 2002; Ho and Wong, 2001; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Street and Gray, 2002; Daske 
and Gebhardt, 2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako, 2007; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Samaha, 
Dahawy, Hussainey and Stapleton, 2012). While there is a burgeoning literature on the nexus between 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure, empirical attention to the relations between CG 
mechanisms and financial performance is still inchoate, especially in developing countries and more 
so in SSA where cultural rigidities, institutional laxity, weak legal and regulatory structures, prebendal 
politics in executive and board appointments and/or political interference, jointly or separately affect 
corporate activities (See: (Herbert, Tsegba, Ene. and Onyilo, 2017; Herbert, 2019)). To be sure, high-
level (board and management) appointments in public and large corporate organizations are of 
secondary importance or relevance only to the extent that the appointees protect or vouch to protect 
the basic interests of the appointing authority or facilitators of the appointments. For the most part, 
merit is thrown out of the window where other considerations prevail. 
Given the vital role banks play in national and global economic development, this study examines 
the effects of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance practices on the financial performance of 
13 NSE-listed banks in Nigeria over the six years, 2011 to 2016. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 
2 overviews the literature on corporate governance (CG) and CG disclosure (CGD). The research 
hypotheses are also formulated therein. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 
discusses the results while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Manifestations of Corporate Governance Disclosure (CGD) Infractions 
The spirit in which CGD infractions manifest adumbrates the agency theoretic problem. It 
represents the framework of the organizational failure of corporate governance in the context of the 
disclosure. Corporate governance disclosure (CGD) infractions encompass a wide range of principal-
agent problems, including (i) false disclosures; (ii) misstatements in financial statements; (iii) internal 
control failures; (iv) market abuses; (v) corporate governance lapses such as poor board oversight, 
irregular approval of directors’ remuneration, unjustified disbursements to directors and management 
of the company, related party transactions not conducted at arm’s length and their non-disclosure in 
financial statements and other kinds of insider abuses such as abnormal deductions and payment of 
dividends above the statutory requirement; (vi) delinquent tax compliance, including non-remittance 
of deductions at source to appropriate tax authorities; (vii) complexity and opacity of company’s 
operations and lack of clarity in company’s structure; and (viii) perpetual lateness in filing annual 
returns. Some of these occur conjunctively or separately. For example, material misstatements in 
financial statements and material internal control deficiencies are contemporaneous with false 
disclosures, market abuses, and corporate governance lapses. Most corporate failures exhibit red flags 
of these governance kinds before their occurrence. 
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2.2 Codification of Corporate Governance Guidelines in Nigeria’s Financial Sector 
Conceptually, a corporate governance disclosure (CGD) is a relevant statement or information 
about a firm’s corporate governance policy and actions taken in response thereof which is released to 
the public to guide or influence investment or stakeholders’ decisions. It is the action of releasing 
relevant information to the public about a firm’s corporate governance policies and practices. In the 
disclosure, the statement or information first identifies the relevant CG policies of the firm or 
organization and, then states the firm’s responsory practices thereto. To improve corporate 
governance, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in September 2008, set to review the 2003 
Code of Corporate Governance for public companies in Nigeria, address the perceived weaknesses in 
public companies, and improve the mechanism for enforceability of the codes. The 2011 SEC Code was 
aimed at strengthening the 2008 codes as well as engendering the highest standards of transparency, 
accountability, and good corporate governance, without unduly inhibiting enterprise and innovation.  
Before the 2004/2005 banking consolidation, there were 89 banks in Nigeria. The banks were 
largely characterized by a low capital base, insolvency and illiquidity, overdependence on 
Government (public sector) deposits, foreign exchange arbitrage trading, poor asset quality, and weak 
corporate governance. The banking consolidation brought radical changes to the nature, structure, and 
modus operandi of banking operations in Nigeria. (See also: (Barros and Caporale, 2012)). Sequel to 
the banking consolidation, the CBN promulgated the 2006 CBN CG Code (CBN-CCG), which was later 
replaced by the 2014 Code for banks and discount houses. Besides the CBN and SEC Codes of 
Corporate Governance, the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) issued the Nigerian Code 
of Corporate Governance (NCCG) in 2018, which replaced all existing sectorial Codes of Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria. All public companies mandatorily comply with the requirements of these 
Codes to putatively enhance good governance practices, engender public confidence to attract 
investments, and promote efficiency and transparency in the market and financial institutions. Table 
1 presents a genealogy of Corporate Governance (CG) Codes in Nigeria.  
Presently in Nigeria, there are 22 commercial banks (or what is commonly referred to as deposit 
money banks (DMBs)). Eight of these have an international authorization, to wit: Access Bank Plc, 
Fidelity Bank Plc, First City Monument Bank Plc (FCMB), First Bank Nigeria Limited, Guaranty Trust 
Bank Plc, Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, United Bank of Africa Plc (UBA) and Zenith Bank Plc. The 
international authorization implies that these are multinational financial institutions with international 
banking services that provide customers with different services both nationally and internationally as 
part of their scheduled services. Eleven of the 22 commercial banks operate under the national 
authorization, namely: Citi Bank Nigeria Limited, Eco Bank Nigeria Plc, Heritage Bank Limited, 
Keystone Bank Limited, Polaris Bank Plc, Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc, Standard Chartered Bank Plc, Sterling 
Bank Plc, Titan Trust Bank Limited, Unity Bank Plc, and Wema Bank Plc. The remaining three 
commercial banks operate under regional authorization, that is, they operate as regional banks. These 
are Suntrust Bank Nigeria Limited, Providus Bank Plc, and Globus Bank. 
Table 1. Corporate Governance (CG) Codes in Nigeria 
S/N CG Codes Year  Industry Mandatory/Voluntary  
1. PenCom Code (PenCom-CCG) 2008 Pensions Mandatory  
2. NAICOM Code (NAICOM-CCG) 2009 Insurance Mandatory 
3. SEC Code (SEC-CCG) (Replaced 2003 
Code) 
2011 Public companies Mandatory 
4. CBN CG Code (CBN-CCG) (Replaced 
2006 Code) 
2014 Banks and Discount 
Houses 
Mandatory 
5. Nigerian Communications Commission 
(NCC) CCG (Replaced 2014 Code) 
2016 Telecommunications Mandatory 
6. Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 
(NCCG) (Replaced FRC 2006 NCCG) 
2018 Private sector companies Mandatory 
Source: Publications of the named regulatory agencies  
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2.3 A Preliminary Statement of the Voluntary Disclosure Framework 
Voluntary or discretionary disclosure issues have been the focus of an increasing amount of 
research since the 1970s when information disclosure or transparency in corporate reporting surfaced 
in response to the burgeoning awareness of the agency problems associated with the divergence of 
interests between diverse ownership and corporate management. The awareness became acute with 
the rapid growth of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their power to control and move resources 
internationally, often at the detriment of host countries’ national interests (Herbert, 1995). In 
consequence, the rise of nationalism brought trade unions and governments on the same page in 
demanding greater transparency, accountability, and information disclosure from the MNEs. Thus, 
from the 1980s to date, there has been a flood of research into the dynamics and ramifications of 
voluntary disclosure (See, for example: (Gray, Shaw, and McSweeney, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983, 2001; 
Jennings and Starks, 1985; Herbert, 1987; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 
1999; Ho and Wong. 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010)). Two things bear 
emphasizing about the triad of corporate accountability, corporate transparency, and corporate 
disclosure. First, both in the national and international contexts, the triad is influenced by a variety of 
economic, social, and political factors (Gray, Shaw, and McSweeney, 1981). Second, in the context of 
corporate information, the triad refers to disclosure of information in published financial reports 
according to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the related Codes of Corporate Governance, such as CBN codes (for 
banks and finance houses) and SEC Codes (for public companies).  
Voluntary disclosure models are discretionary in nature and can be analyzed from two 
interrelated hypotheses, namely: a hypothesis about when to disclose, and a hypothesis about the 
degree of information quality. Likewise, the director’s (beholder’s) discretionary power is twofold: 
discretion to choose the point of disclosure, and discretion to choose the degree of information quality 
(Verrecchia, 1983, 2001; Jennings and Starks, 1985; Herbert, 1987). The threshold level of disclosure is 
that point, whether in degree, level, or time, at which the firm chooses to disclose voluntary 
information or chooses to withhold the same (Herbert, 1987). In effect, the threshold level of disclosure 
is a limiting level below and above which disclosure produces a marginal reaction. 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
Several theoretical frameworks have been employed as explanatory candidates for voluntary 
corporate disclosure. However, theorization in most corporate disclosure research has mainstreamed 
into four interrelated perspectives: agency theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, and signaling 
theory. These can be broadly classified as social and political theories which offer better insights into 
and satisfactory explanations of disclosure practices than economic-based models. The conventional 
assumptions and political considerations surrounding extant accounting disclosures can broadly be 
rationalized as empirical attempts to understand and explain accounting practices from an integrative 
conclave of social and political theories. The term ‘integrative’ defines the accounting strategy or 
political influences of accommodating different shades of opinions and interests in the attempt to find 
a consensus theoretical resolution that satisfies multiple stakeholders, including shareholders, 
regulators, governments, and the society at large.  The integrative process is an assembly of strong 
theoretical candidates that have profound explanatory power or influence. While the theories provide 
sufficient rationale for corporate disclosure, a considerable relationship exists between the theories for 
corporate practices. 
2.4.1 Agency Theory Perspective 
The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) offers a framework that links corporate disclosure 
behavior to firm-specific characteristics. Corporate governance mechanisms are introduced to control 
or mitigate the agency problem and ensure that directors act not just in the interests of shareholders 
but all stakeholders. The agency perspective of CGD creates a dichotomy of interrelationships: the 
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internal and external governance mechanisms. The internal ecosystem of corporate governance 
comprises issues that are within the circle of influence and control of the firm, that is those focal 
areas the board has control over and can act upon. The external governance mechanisms, on the 
other hand, are concerned with issues that are essentially outside the circle of control and influence of 
the firm (the board). External stakeholders, as they are perceived, include the firm's external market, 
government, regulatory bodies, and their rules and regulations and other externalities. External 
governance mechanisms are imposed on and/or controlled by those outside the firm and serve the 
objectives of government, policymakers, regulators, tax authorities, industry/trade union associations, 
and institutional compliance agencies. External stakeholders illuminate the character traits and 
practices of good corporate governance and use their eclectic industry experiences and interactions to 
illustrate authentic guidelines and comparative corporate governance practices. Corporate governance 
mechanisms ensure that directors pursue economic efficiency by minimizing transaction costs. The 
agency theory is architected as an alternative variant of the transaction cost theory. 
2.4.2  Stakeholder Theory Perspective 
Ordinarily, few businesses will trade the pursuit of profit maximization (or shareholder wealth 
maximization) for stakeholder-wide interest pursuit or ethical balancing of sustainability of the 
environment and society (Herbert, Nwaorgu, Onyilo and Iormbagah, 2020). Stakeholder theory is 
anchored on the notion that firms exist at the pleasure of society, reinforcing McKinsey & Company’s 
2020 (Vivian Hunt, Bruce Simpson, and Yuito Yamada) report that “corporations exist with the 
permission of society, and any sector can be regulated out of business.” The CGD aims to provide a 
framework to fully disclose the extent to which the firm has embedded the culture of good corporate 
governance and complied with the codes of CG during a given period. In recent times, multiple voices 
have raised global consciousness about stakeholder capitalism as experience shows that “most boards 
have not sufficiently grappled with the significant implications [of stakeholder capitalism] for their 
organizations” (Huber, Leape, Mark, and Simpson, 2020). This perspective was reinforced at the 
January 2020 World Economic Forum (WEF) at Davos that also marked the 50th anniversary of the 
Forum, where the world leaders were united on the need for a new kind of capitalism, known as 
stakeholder capitalism, to provide new, more diverse and inclusive governance architecture in the way 
organizations conduct their activities. As a result, corporate governance, with comprehensive 
corporate disclosure, has changed profoundly, in terms of attitude towards more inclusive stakeholder 
interests, including environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. 
2.4.3  Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory is another framework for explaining and predicting CGD practice. The premise 
of the legitimacy theory is that an organization is a nexus of social contracts with various stakeholders 
and, as such, its objective pursuits are putatively to fulfil such diverse contractual relationships, as 
opposed to traditional business focus on short-termism and its preoccupation with short-term results 
for shareholders. A company loses its legitimacy if it habitually violates its social contract with its 
community of stakeholders. This phenomenon referred to as the 'legitimacy gap', can result in 
"legitimization threats" (Fernando and Lawrence, 2014). The legitimacy theory of CGD raises the moral 
ground of business activity beyond shareholder wealth maximization to include wider stakeholder 
interests and considerations of what Suchman (1995) describes as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions". The thrust of the legitimacy theory is 
that the globalized world with the integration of national markets and economies has compelled a new 
paradigm or business model that (a) acknowledges a diverse group of stakeholders with different and 
conflicting interests, (b) wittingly recognizes a social contract between a firm and society, and (c) 
accentuates business policies and practices that are beneficial for all stakeholders (Darnall, Henriques, 
and Sadorsky, 2010). In effect, the legitimacy theory provides an understanding of a firm’s behavior in 
developing, implementing, and reporting its CG performance through a CGD framework. 
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2.4.4  Signalling Theory 
The discretionary disclosure hypothesis draws heavily from the signaling literature and the 
assumptions that underlie it and informational asymmetry. The common theme of this theory is that 
information is a signal which reveals (or obscures) the true liquidating value of a firm perturbed by 
some noise (Verrecchia, 1983, 2001). Signaling theory is employed in a variety of economic transactions 
to describe corporate behavior in the presence of asymmetric information or what Williamson (1975) 
tersely characterizes as ‘information impactedness’. Ethically-minded managers with inside 
information will be predisposed to use CGD to signal information to stakeholders about their CG 
practices (for example, economic, environmental, and social performance of their firms), thereby 
enhancing the reputation of the firm. Such specific disclosures could be used as a valued-statement 
signal to convey truly good governance (good CG-compliant status) or CG-friendly firms from poor 
CG practice (CG-unfriendly) firms. Signaling has triggered enormous literature attention and 
application in many decision scenarios in a range of disciplines outside accounting and finance to 
anthropology and zoology (Bird and Smith, 2005). In essence, signaling theory is fundamentally 
concerned with reducing information asymmetry between two or more parties to a given set of actual 
or prospective transactions (Spence, 1973, 2002).  
2.5 Empirical Review 
There is a large and growing literature about different dimensions and contexts of corporate 
governance and corporate reporting and disclosure (See, for example: (Healy and Palepu, 1993, 2001; 
Verrecchia, 1983, 2001; Wallace, Naser, and Mora, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Botosan, 1997; Dockery and Herbert, 2000a, b; Dockery, Herbert and Taylor, 2000; Herbert, 2001; 
Mitton, 2002; Arun and Turner, 2002a, b; Baek, Kang and Park, 2004; Refait-Alexandre, Farvaque, 
Garnet, and Saïdane, 2009; Bhasin, 2010; Herbert and Tsegba, 2011; Jiao, 2011; Subramanian and 
Reddy, 2012; Dockery, Tsegba, and Herbert, 2013; Tsegba and Herbert, 2013a, b; Tsegba, Herbert and 
Ene, 2014; Dembo and Rasaratham, 2014; Emmanuel and Sabastian, 2015; Gyamerah, Amo and 
Adomako, 2020; Soyemi, Afolabi and Obigbemi, 2021)). The attention of this section is limited to the 
literature on the nexus between dimensions and contexts of corporate governance disclosure and 
financial performance. For example, Emmanuel and Sabastian (2015) investigated the relationship 
between corporate governance disclosure (CGD) practices and performance of Nigerian banks, with a 
set of corporate governance indicators derived from 10 listed banks in the NSE from 2000-2009. They 
found CGD to be positively associated with performance, whereby banks with higher disclosure 
profiles posted better results than banks with lesser disclosure. 
Mitton (2002) analyzed the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian crisis and reported 
that firms with higher disclosure quality had better stock price performance. Similarly, Baek, Kang, 
and Park (2004) reported that firms with higher disclosure quality experienced greater stability, (that 
is, suffered less), from the shock of the Korean crisis. Jiao (2011) documented a significantly positive 
association between corporate disclosure rankings, market valuation, and firm performance. 
Corporate disclosure also affects the cost of capital (See, for example: (Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998)) 
and on market valuation of financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors (DeFond, 
Hann and Hu, 2005). Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni, and Power (2009) examined the value relevance of 
disclosure in the Egyptian capital market and observed a positive but insignificant relationship. They 
argued that the statistical insignificance might be due to the interplay of different causal factors in the 
equation of disclosure and firm value. Wagenhofer (2004) posits that the effects of disclosure depend 
on three factors: uncertainty, multi-person settings with conflicts of interest, and information 
asymmetry. Othman (2012) examined the impact of board structure and process disclosure level on 
corporate performance in the emerging African markets and reported a significant positive 
relationship, with the effect more pronounced amongst Anglophone African firms than their 
Francophone counterparts. The author also found evidence of colonial heritage influence. 
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Ntim, Kwaku, and Danbolt (2012) examined the effects of CGD differences in the shareholder 
versus stakeholder dichotomy and whether the differences explain the variations in the market value 
of South African firms. Their results confirmed a positive association between CGD practices and firm 
value, with the effect of CG provisions stronger for shareholders than for other stakeholders. Collett 
and Hrasky (2005) examined the relationship between the voluntary disclosure of information about 
corporate governance practices and the intention to raise external finance, using corporate governance 
disclosures in the annual reports of Australian companies in 1994. They found a positive association 
of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information to raise equity capital, but not intending 
to raise debt capital. Achoki, Kule, and Shukla (2016) examined the effect of voluntary disclosure on 
the financial performance of 14 Rwandan banks over the period of 2011 to 2016. They observed that 
variations in voluntary disclosure had an explanatory effect on financial performance. 
Other studies, such as Brown and Caylor, 2006; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010; Al-Akra and Ali, 
2012, have shown that enhanced CGD practice improves firm value. For instance, Brown and Caylor 
(2006) show that some corporate governance provisions are positively associated with firm value. 
Disclosure influences firm value via two mechanisms: impact through firm risk, and expected future 
cash flows (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; Al-Akra and Ali, 2012). The burgeoning literature 
notwithstanding, the microanalytic frameworks, confounding ownership structures and conflicting 
disclosure results in these studies affirm a lack of consistent evidence (Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni and 
Power, 2009). The interplay of different determinants of the relationship between disclosure and firm 
value implies that there is some scope for improvement in the level of corporate governance standards 
and quality of corporate disclosures (See, for example: (Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni, and Power, 2009; 
Bhasin, 2010; Tsegba and Herbert, 2013a, b). The present study seeks to join the literature in espousing 
the relationship between corporate governance disclosure and firm performance, within the context of 
the Nigerian banking industry. We also bring into the mainstream conversation of corporate 
governance the complementarity of hindsight, oversight, foresight, and insight in broadening our 
understanding of and/or shaping corporate governance practices.  
2.6 Development of Research Hypotheses 
2.6.1 Corporate Governance Disclosure of Board of Directors and Financial Performance 
The board of directors is the custodian of corporate governance of its organization and formulates 
the firm’s strategic policies and plans and exercises ultimate responsibility for accountability, 
performance, and disclosure. The buck of corporate governance stops on the board's table (MD or 
Chairman). The board of directors' corporate governance disclosures illuminates the board practices, 
including board composition and structure to facilitate monitoring by stakeholders. This shapes their 
perception of how well or otherwise the firm is governed. Research shows that there is a nexus between 
the governance of firms and their levels of disclosure, such that those better-governed firms make 
more informative disclosures (Beekes and Brown, 2006). Although a variety of market value ratios are 
available, the most popular include earnings per share (EPS), return on equity (ROE) and return on 
assets (ROA). Each of these measures is used differently, but when combined, they offer a broad 
financial portrait of the firm. In addition, these market value ratios give management an idea of what 
a firm's investors think of its performance and prospects. Thus, we formulate the following general 
null hypothesis. 
 
H01: Corporate governance disclosure of board of directors (CGDBD) has no significant effect 
on the financial performance of banks (ROA, ROE, and EPS, respectively). This general hypothesis is 
decomposed into the following three hypotheses. Financial performance is proxied by ROA, ROE, and 
EPS. 
H01A: Corporate governance disclosure of board of directors (CGDBD) has no significant 
positive effect on return on assets (ROA) of Nigerian banks. 
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H01B: Corporate governance disclosure of board of directors (CGDBD) has no significant 
positive effect on return on equity (ROE) of Nigerian banks. 
H01C: Corporate governance disclosure of board of directors (CGDBD) has no significant 
positive effect on earnings per share (EPS) of Nigerian banks. 
2.6.2 Corporate Governance Disclosure of Risk Framework and Financial Performance 
The SEC (2011) and the CBN (2014) recommend that banks should adopt effective risk 
management practices at every level to help safeguard and create shareholder value. An effective risk 
mitigation policy develops strategies and programs for risk prevention, detection and deterrence, and 
risk disclosure. Corporate governance risk management framework (CGRMF) seeks to (a) increase the 
economic efficiency of the bank’s operations by decreasing leakages caused by internal control failure 
of error, fraud, or corruption, (b) diminish the bank's overall exposure to various kinds of risks, (c) 
enhance the bank's capacity to sustain these risks that may hamper or reduce its daily operations, and 
(d) enhance the depositors', political and international support for the bank's programs. The CGDRMF 
promotes risk awareness, operational and strategic decision-making, including internal control, the 
level of commitment and support of the board, management, and employees in assessing, responding, 
and controlling risks as well as mitigating regulatory scrutiny and attendant regulatory costs 
(Meulbroek, 2002). Thus, the following general null hypothesis is formulated. 
H02: Corporate governance disclosure of risk management (CGDRM) has no significant 
positive effect on the financial performance of banks (proxied by ROA, ROE, and EPS, respectively). 
This general hypothesis is disaggregated into the following three hypotheses.  
H02A: Corporate governance disclosure of risk management (CGDRM) has no significant 
positive effect on the return on assets (ROA) of Nigerian banks. 
H02B:  Corporate governance disclosure of risk management (CGDRM) has no significant 
positive effect on the return on equity (ROE) of Nigerian banks. 
H02C: Corporate governance disclosure of risk management (CGDRM) has no significant 
positive effect on earnings per share (EPS) of Nigerian banks. 
2.6.3 Corporate Governance Disclosure of Whistle Blowing Policy and Financial Performance 
Banking operations are characterized by a variety of unethical practices such as fraud and 
corruption, insider dealing, and expropriation of minority shareholders (Sanusi, 2010). 
Whistleblowing has emerged as an effective anti-fraud and anti-corruption policy measure, adopted 
by national and multilateral governments, including the United Nations (Stachowicz-Stanusch and 
Wankel, 2011; Robert, 2014; Herbert, 2019). The global popularity of whistleblowing is such that 
Fortune 500 companies include it in their antifraud policy initiatives to enhance integrity, 
transparency, and accountability. Whistleblowing is the reporting by employees or anyone with 
intimate knowledge of, or useful information about, suspected misconduct, illegal acts, or related 
suspicions or violations of a fraudulent nature (Herbert, 2019). The policy entails disclosure by persons 
with subterranean or inside knowledge of illegal, immoral, or fraudulent practices perpetrated against 
an organization or government to the relevant authority with capacity to institute appropriate action 
(see also: (Micelli and Near 1992; Micelli, Near, and Dworkin, 2008)). A company institutes a 
whistleblowing policy to embolden employees and others to avail it of their serious concerns about 
the ethical implications of the firm's activities. The disclosure of whistleblowing policy is likely to 
engender trust and confidence in staff, management, and stakeholders in general, and thus boost 
financial performance and firm value. Thus, the following null hypotheses are formulated. 
 
H03A:  Corporate governance disclosure of whistle-blowing policy (CGDWB) has no significant 
positive effect on the return on assets (ROA) of Nigerian banks. 
H03B:  Corporate governance disclosure of whistle-blowing policy has no significant positive 
effect on return on equity (ROE) of Nigerian banks. 
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H03C:  Corporate governance disclosure of whistle-blowing policy has no significant positive 
effect on earnings per share (EPS) of Nigerian banks. 
2.6.4 Moderating effect of control variables of size and block-holding 
Bank size and block shareholding are used as moderator variables in this study, the objective 
being to determine their effect on the direction and/or strength of the relation between the dependent 
and independent variables.  The null hypothesis of no significant effect is posed. 
H04: Bank size and block shareholdings have no significant moderating effect on the financial 
performance of banks. 
3. Data and Methods  
The data consist of 78 annual observations (reports) of 13 Nigerian banks, from 1st January 2011 
to 31st December 2016, which were obtained from the Fact Book of the NSE (Appendix 1). The latter 
contained the required information for the 13 banks listed on the NSE, covering the 6 years. The choice 
of this period was to ensure data availability and to account for the developments in these variables. 
Besides, with the enforcement of the corporate governance codes by the NSE, data from 2011 onwards 
were used because in subsequent years NSE regulations influenced listed companies to make 
disclosures about their corporate governance practices. The empirical specification is a content analysis 
evaluation process of CG data in the annual reports of the banks from where CG disclosure indices 
were then constructed (Appendix 2). The use of content analysis is consistent with the disclosure 
literature (Wallace, Naser, and Mora, 1994; Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
Botosan, 1997; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako, 2007; Herbert, Nwaorgu, Onyilo and Iormbagah, 
2020). For a company’s annual reports, content analysis entails a systematic perusal and codification 
of the body of texts, narratives, images, and other symbolic presentations of the company into various 
contextual categories, based on predefined criteria. The study adopted the (OLS) regression to estimate 
the parameters of the relationship between CGD and financial performance.  
3.1 Test for normal distribution (Table 2) 
We performed the Shapiro-Wilk normality test to confirm if the sample comes from a population 
with a normal distribution. Small values of the test indicate that the sample is not normally distributed, 
and the null hypothesis of the normal distribution is rejected. If the value of the Shapiro-Wilk test (W) 
is greater than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is not rejected, and the data are deemed to be normal. If 
the W-value is below 0.05, it signifies a significant deviation of the data from a normal distribution, and 
the null hypothesis is rejected. As table 2 demonstrates, the W-values of all the models and their 
associated p-values are greater than 0.05 in each case. They fail to reject the null hypothesis and thus 
confirm that the data exhibit a normal distribution. 
Table 2. Shapiro-Wilk W Normality Test 
Model Variable No. of Observations W Z p-value 
1A ROA 78 0.96980 1.549 0.06067 
1B ROE 78 0.98504 0.013 0.49489 
1C EPS 78 0.98866 -0.594 0.72374 
2A ROA 78 0.96951 1.571 0.05814 
2B ROE 78 0.97971 0.680 0.24835 
2C EPS 78 0.98492 0.030 0.48783 
3A ROA 78 0.97613 0.035 0.15036 
3B ROE 78 0.98657 -0.223 0.5818 
3C EPS 78     0.98660 -0.238 0.59404 
Note. H0 = The data are from the normal distribution. Reject H0 if p-values are <0.05, otherwise accept.  
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3.2 Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity (Table 3) 
A fundamental assumption of the OLS is homoskedasticity, that is, the variance of the error term 
is constant. The Breusch-Pagan test is used to detect any linear form of heteroskedasticity. The null 
hypothesis is that of equality of the error variances. A large or small chi-square indicates the presence 
or absence of heteroskedasticity, respectively. The p-value of the chi-squared test with the null 
hypothesis was rejected for p-value < 0.05. In this case, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is 
accepted for all the models. 
Table 3. Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity  
Model Variable χ2 (1) p-value 
1A ROA 0.02 0.8958 
1B ROE 0.00 0.9844 
1C EPS 2.36 0.1242 
2A ROA 0.14 0.7115 
2B ROE 0.11 0.7368 
2C EPS 3,86 0.1151 
3A ROA 0.01 0.9037 
3B ROE 0.08 0.7815 
3C EPS 0.24 0.6208 
Note: H0 = The the error variances are all equal. Reject H0 if p-value < 0.05; otherwise accept. The models and 
variables are as specified in hypotheses 1A… 3C. 
3.3 Durbin-Watson Test for Serial Correlation (Table 4) 
The Durbin-Watson test was done to detect the presence of autocorrelation or serial correlation 
in the residuals from the regression analysis and to assess the strength of the relationship between the 
variables. Contextually, the autocorrelation of the residuals is bad and signifies that the data points 
are not correlated well enough to support or justify the model. The null hypothesis is that the residuals 
from OLS regression are not autocorrelated or serially correlated. As Table 4 evinces, there is no 
evidence of autocorrelation in the models.  
Table 4. Durbin-Watson Test for Serial Correlation 
Model Durbin-Watson d-statistic Decision 
Model 1A 1.26076 No serial correlation 
Model 1B 1.29009 No serial correlation 
Model 1C 1.438852 No serial correlation 
Model 2A 1.484307 No serial correlation 
Model 2B 1.467621 No serial correlation 
Model 2C 1.555818 No serial correlation 
Model 3A 1.462178 No serial correlation 
Model 3B 1.424731 No serial correlation 
Model 3C 1.515349 No serial correlation 
H0 = the residuals from an OLS regression are not serially correlated. The value of D-W statistic ranges from 0 - 4. 
3.4 Variance Inflation factor and Multicollinearity checks 
Multicollinearity exists when the independent variables are themselves correlated. The variance 
inflation factor (VIF) and its reciprocal, tolerance, are two closely related statistical tools for diagnosing 
multicollinearity in a regression model. Table 5 exhibits a summary of the VIF and tolerance values. A 
correlation between the independent variables is considered undesirable for multivariate analysis only 
if it exceeds 0.8 (Barako and Tower, 2006; Tsegba and Herbert, 2013a). The VIF for all the variables is 
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less than 2, which is far less than 10 considered harmful for regression analysis (Gujarati and 
Sangeetha, 2007). Tolerance ranges from 0 to 1, where high tolerance (e.g., 0.84) implies low 
multicollinearity while low tolerance (e.g., 0.19) suggests high (serious) multicollinearity (Glen, 2018). 
The VIF and tolerance values affirm that multicollinearity is not a concern in this study. 
Table 5. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 VIF Tolerance (1/VIF) VIF Tolerance (1/VIF) VIF Tolerance (1/VIF) 
CGDBD 1.44 0.693059     
CGDRMF   1.04 0.963812   
CGDWBP     1.74 0.574208 
SIZE 1.31 0.765494 1.04 0.959810 1.48 0.673663 
BLOCK 1.15 0.869072 1.08 0.926002 1.23 0.816014 
Mean VIF 1.30  1.05  1.48  
The VIF measures how much multicollinearity exists in a regression model. Higher values denote 
multicollinearity, which could negatively impact the regression model, vice versa. 
4. Results  
Table 6 presents the regression results of the nexus between CGD of Directors and ROA, ROE, 
and EPS. The results are partitioned into three models, 1A to 1C, indicating in each case the statistical 
relationship with bank performance, proxied by ROA, ROE, and EPS, respectively. Model 1A shows 
that the relationship between corporate governance disclosure of board of directors (CGDBD) and 
ROA is positively significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.024). This contrasts with the a priori 
expectation, which means that the null hypothesis (H01A) is sustained. Model 1B indicates a positive 
coefficient on CGDBD.  Though the direction is not as predicted, the relationship (H01B) is not 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.165), leading to the acceptance of the null hypothesis. Model 1C 
reports a positive and statistically significant coefficient on CGDBD (p-value = 0.009), which fails to 
reject the null hypothesis (H01C). The model includes bank size and block shareholdings as control 
variables. Bank size projects positive coefficients across the models. The positive effect is statistically 
significant in models 1B and 1C. While model 1A records a positive coefficient on block shareholding, 
models 1B and 1C present negative coefficients. In all three models, the influence of block shareholding 
is insignificant. 
Table 6. OLS Regression of CGD Score on Directors and Bank Performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) 
 Model 1A (ROA) Model 1B (ROE) Model 1C (EPS) 










CGDBD 82.504 2.30    0.024  48.0663 1.40 0.165 81.738 2.68    0.009 
Size 4.566 1.79 0.77 6.29392 2.58 0.012 7.803 3.60 0.001 
Block 6.843 0.63    0.530 -5.41191 -0.52 0.603 -4.602 -0.50 0.619 
Intercept -119.81 -2.47 0.016 -126.078  -2.71    -183.239 -4.44 0.000 
Observations 78   78   78   
F (3, 74) 5.29  0.002 6.00  0.0010 14.21  0.000 
R-squared 0.177   0.196   0.365   
 
Table 7 displays the results of the three models on the relationship between corporate governance 
disclosure of risk management framework (CGDRMF) and bank performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS). 
Model 2A indicates that CGDRMF is positively related to ROA. However, this relationship (H02A) is 
not statistically significant (p-value = 0.184), leading to the acceptance of the null hypothesis. Model 
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2B of the table shows a positive but statistically insignificant effect with a p-value of 0.623. Thus, the 
null hypothesis (H02B) of no significant effect on ROE is accepted. Model 2C presents the result of the 
test of the effect of CGDRMF on EPS (H02C). The result confirms a positive but insignificant effect (p-
value = 0.246). Thus, the null hypothesis H02C is upheld. 
Table 7. OLS Regression of CGD Score on Risk Management and Bank Performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) 
 Model 2A (ROA) Model 2B (ROE) Model 2C (EPS) 
Variable Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value 
CGDRMF 52.795 1.34 0.184 18.4150 0.49 0.623  39.7313 1.17 0.246 
Sze 7.115 3.06 0.003 7.80092 3.54 0.001 10.3508 5.16 0.000 
Block -3.603 -0.34 0.738 -10.8572 -1.07 0.289 -14.2987 -1.54 0.127 
Intercept -151.651 -2.60 0.011 -134.929 -2.44 0.017 -204.904 -4.07 0.000 
Observations 78   78   78   
F (3, 74) 3.97  0.011 5.310  0.0023 11.41  0.000 
R-squared 0.1386   0.177   0.3163   
4.1 OLS Regression of CGD Score on Directors and Bank Performance  
Table 8. Effect of Size and Block holdings on the Relationship between CGD and Bank Performance 
 Model 3A (ROA) Model 3B (ROE) Model 3C (EPS) 
Variable Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value 
CGDWBP 49.9861 2.28 0.025 37.4411 1.80 0.076 62.6491 3.46 0.001 
Size 3.82300 1.41 0.164 5.29702 2.06 0.043 6.17729 2.75 0.007 
Block 9.04160 0.81 0.422 -2.48191 -0.23 0.816 .177824 0.02 0.985 
Intercept -75.0545 -1.48 0.144 -94.1611 -1.95 0.054 -129.67 -3.09 0.003 
Observations 78   78   78   
F (3, 74) 5.26  0.0024 6.52  0.0006 16.50  0.0000 
R-squared 0.1756   0.2091   0.4008   
 
Table 8 shows the results of the effect of corporate governance disclosure of whistle-blowing 
policy (CGDWBP) on bank performance. Model 3A indicates a significantly positive effect at the 5% 
level (p-value = 0.025). This leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (H03A). Model 3B shows a positive 
and significant relationship, in which case the null hypothesis (H03B) is rejected. Model 3C also indicates 
that corporate governance disclosure of whistle-blowing policy (CGDWBP) is positively and 
significantly related to earnings per share (EPS). Thus, H03C is rejected. In respect of the control 
variables, bank size has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between CGD and the financial 
performance of banks. However, this effect is only significant in models 3B and 3C, which is 
concerning ROE and EPS. Block shareholdings present mixed results across the models. While models 
3A and 3C record positive coefficients, model 3B shows a negative coefficient which indicates an 
inverse relationship. In effect, all the relationships are not significant. 
5. Discussion of Findings 
The model numbers relate to tables 6 to 8 above. Model 1A (Table 6) indicates that a one-percent 
increase in the disclosure of corporate governance issues concerning the board of directors (CGDBD) 
is associated with an 82 percent increase in bank performance (ROA), all other variables held constant. 
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Similarly, Model 1C indicates that a one-percent increase in the disclosure level of corporate 
governance matters of the board of directors (CGDBD) leads to an increase of 82 kobos (or 82 percent 
increase) in bank performance proxy of EPS. A one-percent increase in the CGDBD is associated with 
a 48 percent increase in ROE in Model 1B, ceteris paribus. The findings are consistent with prior studies 
on the effect of corporate governance and its disclosure on firm performance (See: (Achoki, Kule, and 
Shukla, 2016; Jiao, 2011; Ntim, Kwaku, and Danbolt, 2012)). The CGDBD signals alignment 
commitment with international best practices and acts as managerial incentives for the banks. This 
finding is not surprising since the responsibility for ensuring good corporate governance rests with 
the board just as it is held responsible for poor performance and corporate failures (Agrawal and 
Chadha, 2005). Indeed, the crucial role of the board of directors in the organizational survival and 
systemic role of banks is such that regulators take serious umbrage at insider-related corporate 
governance infractions. The regulatory exceptions often lead to the dismissal of the board, as was the 
case with some Nigerian banks in 2009 (See: (Sanusi, 2010; Herbert, Onyilo, Ene and Tsegba, 2017; 
Herbert, Tsegba, Ene. and Onyilo, 2017)), and the latest CBN’s action against the board of First Bank 
of Nigeria Limited and its parent company, FBN Holdings Plc. The result of this study further calls for 
effective and transparent boards in the management of banks to command the trust and confidence of 
stakeholders, depositors, and customers. 
Risk is important for any organization, more so for banks. Banks are exposed to some risks 
including operational, credit, liquidity, market, and sovereign risks. Overexposure or improperly 
managed risks can lead to chaos, crisis, and bank failure with disastrous consequences for depositors 
and the economy as a whole. This partly explains why banks are highly subjected to prudential 
guidelines and regulations. The ability of a bank to prudently manage its risks translates into its 
capacity to help its customers manage their risk exposures which, in turn, helps the bank to sustain 
fewer loan losses and improve profits. The results of models 2A, 2B, and 2C substantiate a positive 
effect of disclosure of risk management framework on firm performance. The effect is not significant 
perhaps due to weak or nondurable risk management system to fully capture the intricate risk factors, 
such as political risks or risks associated with lending to politically exposed persons. The rising cases 
and structure of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in Nigerian banks lend credence to this viewpoint.  
Models 3A, 3B, and 3C present a positive and significant association between the disclosure of 
whistle-blowing policy and the financial performance of banks. In Model 3A, for a one percent increase 
in the disclosure level of the whistle-blowing policy, the ROA increases by 50%, ceteris paribus. Models 
3B and 3C buttress the evidence that an increase in disclosure of whistle-blowing policy is strongly 
associated with an increase in ROE and EPS, ceteris paribus. This supports Bushman, Piotroski, and 
Smith's (2004) perspective on the value relevance of corporate transparency. An effective whistle-
blowing policy can mitigate unethical practices in the banking industry and boost corporate 
performance. 
Across the models, the study finds that bank size is useful in explaining the link between 
corporate governance disclosure and financial performance. This is consistent with the empirical 
findings that large firms have better opportunities and can quickly muster sufficient resources to install 
and implement robust disclosure mechanisms (Fanta, Kemal, and Waka, 2013; Madhani, 2016a, b). 
Madhani (2016a) found a statistically significant difference between corporate governance and 
disclosure practices of large firms and small Indian firms with the conclusion that corporate 
governance and disclosure practices of large firms are better than those of small firms.  
The role of block shareholdings coheres with the evidence of mixed results of Isshaq, Bokpin, and 
Mensah (2009). The authors found a significantly positive relationship between board size and share 
price among the corporate governance variables but found none between inside ownership and share 
price. A few comments on block shareholding may help elucidate its inconsistent role and account for 
the inconsistent result across the models. The nexus between corporate ownership and corporate 
performance remains a contentious issue in corporate governance, corporate law, and institutional 
economics. The ownership-performance-debate (OPD) is of special interest in emerging and transition 
economies where wholesale privatization and commercialization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
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are crucial aspects of economic reforms (Tsegba, Herbert and Ene, 2014). To be sure, economic reforms 
of the privatization genre have implications for ownership structure and control, corporate 
governance, and corporate performance. This is the context in which the discriminating properties of 
concentrated ownership, foreign ownership or block-holder ownership, or core/strategic investor 
((Tsegba and Herbert, 2013b) can be discerned. The distinguishing feature of these ownership 
structures is the size of the ownership stake, which imbues both the government incentives and 
capacity to engage in economic transactions. For example, a large stake in the form of strategic/core 
investor2, foreign ownership, concentrated, block-holding, or block shareholder ownership, entitles 
more voting rights, more clout and greater say in policymaking, governance structure, and managerial 
influence. 
6. Conclusions  
Over the years, corporate governance disclosure has become a key part of business practice and 
has precipitated a powerful trend around the world, especially for banks and oil companies whose 
operational activities impinge on people’s lives and livelihoods. Thus, using the firms’ CG reports to 
assess their corporate performance is an affirmative empirical attempt at improving corporate 
governance reporting as well as the firm’s image. Corporate governance disclosures paint a positive 
picture of the company’s ecosystem. In general, effective or progressive corporate governance 
practice enables the directors to take responsibility for their decisions and the performance of their 
organizations as a whole. It enables them to have a clear organizational strategy, effective risk 
management, discipline and commitment, proper attention to employees and customers, corporate 
transparency and information sharing, corporate social responsibility, and regular self-evaluations 
to identify and mitigate brewing problems. Above all, progressive corporate governance leverages 
individual executives and enhances corporate trust and reputation 
This study examines the effect of CGD on the financial performance of banks listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) from 2011 to 2016. We further develop a disclosure checklist as a 
research instrument to collect the CG data. The checklist is anchored on the provisions of the 2014 
Codes of Corporate Governance of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN-CCG) for banks and finance 
houses and 2011 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC-CCG)) for the capital market. We also use 
content analysis to extract CG data from 78 annual reports of 13 commercial banks. We then construct 
three corporate governance disclosure indices (CGDI), namely: CGDI on board of directors, CGDI on 
risk management framework, and CGDI on whistle-blowing policy. We then formulate and test 10 
hypotheses (condensed into four) using, OLS method of multiple regressions. The research findings 
have policy implications for banks and stakeholders, especially regulators. For banks, the study calls 
for (i) an increase in CGD in their annual reports, and (ii) a disaggregation of CGD to enhance 
transparency and understanding. For regulators, the study advocates for (a) regulatory reassessment 
of the disclosure requirements in the risk management framework to ensure that every aspect of risk 
is captured, especially political risks; regulatory requirement regarding whistleblowing policy and the 
disclosure thereof; and (b) regulatory enforcement of the disclosure requirements by imposing stiffer 
penalties on contraventions. Progressive corporate governance practice (with disclosure) is neither a 
nontrivial nor costless organizational activity (See also: (Baumann and Nier (2004)). Effective and 
transparent boards of banks engender the trust and confidence of regulators, stakeholders, depositors, 
                                                 
2 The concept of a ‘core/strategic investor’ has not received any meaningful attention in the literature of corporate governance 
and ownership structure and control even though it has, indeed, been practiced in some jurisdictions. For instance, in China, 
listed companies normally have one ultimate owner who holds a significant percentage of total shares and control of their 
operations (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, and Zhang, 2005). The concept resonates with the Nigerian privatization programmed. 
Conceptually, core investors are perceived as economic agents who possess the simultaneous complementarity of three key 
attributes: (a) technical know-how concerning the activities of the enterprise they wish to invest in; (b) financial muscle, not only 
to pay a competitive price for the enterprise they wish to buy into but also to turn around its fortune, using their resources 
without relying on the Government for funds; and (c) managerial know-how to run the enterprise profitably in a competitive 
business environment dictated by market forces. These attributes provide the bureaucratic insularity needed to obviate (a) the 
manifestation of bureaucratic opportunism, and (b) the adverse consequences of the separation of ownership and control in the 
privatized firm. Put simply, core investors are those that have or must-have, the entrepreneurial bent, mechanisms, and 
incentives to own and manage the privatized enterprises (Tsegba and Herbert, 2011). 
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and customers. Finally, good corporate governance practice contributes not only to corporate 
sustainability but also to the sustainable development of the economy. 
While a bank can manipulate the information disclosed, deliberately complicate the information 
content, make it prohibitively costly to discern, or create uncertainty when to disclose information and 
thus affect its decision-usefulness by investors and other stakeholders (Refait-Alexandre, Farvaque, 
Gainet and Saïdane, 2009), the difficult conundrum of inefficient markets is inextricably implied. This 
presumption is a trend that is prevalent in SSA. In SSA jurisdictions, where regulatory institutions are 
both corrupt and weak and bounded rationality challenges are rife amidst environmental factors of 
uncertainty, opportunism, and small-numbers exchange relations (Williamson, 1975; Herbert, 2019), 
transforming information communicated by the company into usable knowledge by investors, 
regulators and wider stakeholders require a great deal of work and if disclosure makes this work less 
profitable for financial analysts and informed agents, this will prospectively reduce or attenuate the 
overall knowledge of the company. On the other hand, Refait-Alexandre, Farvaque, Gainet and 
Saïdane (2009) argue that as some investors are better informed and better able to discern and process 
information than others, a phenomenon of bounded rationality, disclosure can increase the 
information impacted news problem that exists among the different stakeholders (See also: 
(Wagenhofer, 2004)). When, therefore, third party stakeholders have information disparity under the 
atmosphere of corporate disclosure (that is, while companies display a disclosure policy), stakeholders 
may be victims of a knowledge illusion, whereby they think they have full knowledge of the company 
while that is not the case (Refait-Alexandre, Farvaque, Gainet and Saïdane, 2009).  
The associated market/investor behavior may exacerbate financial market instability, increase the 
risks of information bubbles, and worsen their consequences when the bubbles burst. Anecdotal 
evidence points to this elusive market performance in SSA countries where both regulators and the 
regulated (operators) are participants in the same markets, or dominant market presence of unlawful 
monopolization is explicit. Nigeria and other SSA countries are bedeviled by these challenges 
juxtaposing corruption, weak political and economic governance, and institutional lethargy and 
weakness. First, the moral compass of accountability and transparency in these countries suffers from 
a serious deficit. This is the culture in which codes of corporate governance and disclosure practices 
are practiced. Second and related, board appointments in banks follow the same jaundiced trajectory 
of adverse selection with consequential moral hazards. Third, the prevailing evidence of regulatory 
capture in Nigeria’s financial sector is a moral hazard consequence of adverse selection. This milieu 
cannot engender progressive corporate governance; instead, it weakens institutional capacity which 
obfuscates disclosure. These are some of the regulatory and policy challenges implicit in governance 
disclosure. A conclusive suggestion canvasses greater empirical assessment of the economic 
consequences of corporate governance disclosure in emerging economies. 
As with most empirical studies, this study is not without its limitations, despite its contribution 
to knowledge. However, these limitations also are interesting and fruitful avenues for future research. 
First, the dimensions of corporate governance are an evolving phenomenon of empirical research, 
especially in SSA. The implication is that no study can claim a significant level of comprehensiveness 
in covering the phenomena of interest. Second, the study sample was limited to Nigerian commercial 
banks, the stylized deposit money banks. A more robust or inclusive approach will be an evaluation 
of CG disclosure practices of banks and discount houses since the CBN-CCG codes encompass banks 
and discount houses. Also, a comparative analysis of the CG disclosure and corporate performance of 
Nigerian banks and discount houses will be a useful avenue. This study is limited to three measures 
of profitability angle of accounting returns which also provide a stock market evaluation of firm (bank) 
performance. Firm performance is measured by return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
earnings per share (EPS). Both ROA and ROE are accounting performance measures while EPS is a 
market‐based performance measure. While the accounting performance measures are more 
appropriate for firms pursuing share‐increasing and turnaround business investment strategies, both 
accounting and market‐based measures are more appropriate for firms pursuing less risky profit‐
oriented business investment strategies (Wayne and Jones, 1996). Because corporate performance is a 
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complex construct in strategic management and accounting and finance, research dimensionalizes the 
praxes of performance measurement to include accounting returns (profitability and liquidity 
dimensions), growth, and stock market performance (Hamann, Schiemann, Bellora, and Guenther, 
2013). The acknowledgment of these broader dimensions of corporate performance is a limitation of 
this study but also opens vistas of future research. 
Appendix 1:  Sampled Nigerian Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) 
S/N DEPOSIT MONEY BANK 
1 Access Bank Plc 
2 Diamond Bank Plc 
3 FBN Holdings Plc 
4 Fidelity Bank Plc 
5 FCMB Group Plc 
6 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc 
7 Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc 
8 Sterling Bank Plc 
9 Union Bank of Nigeria Plc 
10 United Bank for Africa Plc 
11 Unity Bank Plc 
12 Wema Bank Plc 
13 Zenith Bank Plc 
APPENDIX  2: Corporate Governance Disclosure Checklist 
S/N GROUP CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE ITEMS 
CGBDB Corporate Governance Disclosure on Board of Directors 
1 CGDBD Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/MD are split.  
2 CGDBD Whether the chairperson of the board is a non-executive director.  
3 CGDBD Whether the board is composed of a majority of non-executive directors (NEDs).  
4 CGDBD How often does the board meet? Whether the board meets at least four times in a year.  
5 CGDBD Whether the records of individual directors’ meetings are disclosed.  
6 CGDBD Whether directors are classified into executive directors, NED, and independent directors.  
7 CGDBD Whether the board’s evaluation report is disclosed.  
8 CGDBD Whether directors’ biography and experience are disclosed.  
9 CGDBD Whether share ownership by all insiders is disclosed 
10 CGDBD Whether a nomination committee has been established.  
11 CGDBD Whether the nomination committee consists of a majority of NEDs.  
12 CGDBD Whether the chairperson of the nomination committee is a NED.  
13 CGDBD Whether the members of the nomination committee are disclosed.  
14 CGDBD Whether the nomination committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
15 CGDBD Whether a remuneration committee has been established.  
16 CGDBD Whether the remuneration committee is constituted entirely by independent NEDs.  
17 CGDBD Whether the chairperson of the remuneration committee is an independent NED.  
18 CGDBD Whether the members of the remuneration committee are disclosed.  
19 CGDBD Whether the remuneration committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed.  
20 CGDBD Whether a firm’s board is formed by at least one male and one female (board diversity 
based on gender) person.  
21 CGDBD Whether bank succession plan for their top executives is disclosed 
22 CGDBD Whether the board of directors has at least two independent NED.  
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CGDRF: Corporate Governance Disclosure on Risk Framework 
1 CGDRF Whether an audit committee has been established.  
2 CGDRF Whether the audit committee is constituted by NEDs and shareholders representatively.       
3 CGDRF Whether the chairperson of the audit committee is a shareholder representative. 
4 CGDRF Whether the members of the audit committee are disclosed.  
5 CGDRF Whether the members of the audit committee are split equally between shareholders and 
directors. 
6 CGDRF Whether the audit committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed.  
7 CGDRF Whether a risk management committee has been established.  
8 CGDRF Whether the risk committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed.  
9 CGDRF Whether a narrative on both actual and potential future systematic and non-systematic 
risks is disclosed.  
10 CGDRF Whether a narrative of the risk framework is disclosed.  
11 CGDRF Whether the existence of a Chief Risk Officer is disclosed 
12 CGDRF Whether a narrative of the procedures and processes for identification, measurement, 
monitoring, control, and reporting of the current and future risks is disclosed. 
13 CGDRF  Whether a narrative on the actual measures taken by a firm to address occupational 
health and safety of its employees is disclosed.  
14 CGDRF Whether the bank's handling of consumer complaints is disclosed.  
15 CGDRF Whether a credit committee has been established.  
16 CGDRF Whether the chairperson of the credit committee is a NED.  
17 CGDRF Whether the members of the credit committee are disclosed.  
18 CGDRF Whether the credit committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed.  
19 CGDRF Whether corporate governance compliance status is disclosed 
20 CGDRF Whether related party transactions are disclosed 
21 CGDRF Whether regulatory/supervisory contraventions are disclosed 
22 CGDRF Whether regulatory penalties and sanctions are disclosed 
23 CGDRF Whether frauds and forgeries are disclosed 
 
CGDWBP: Corporate Governance Disclosure on Whistleblowing Policy 
1 CGDWBP Whether the bank whistle-blowing policy is disclosed.  
2 CGDWBP  Whether a narrative on the existence of a code of ethics is disclosed.  
3 CGDWBP Whether a narrative of bank whistleblowing procedure is disclosed 
4 CGDWBP Whether a narrative that the bank whistle-blowing policy is appropriately communicated 
to all employees is disclosed. 
5 CGDWBP Whether a narrative of declaration of management and board commitment to the 
whistleblowing policy is disclosed 
6 CGDWBP Whether the objectives of the whistleblowing policy are disclosed 
7 CGDWBP Whether an analysis of whistleblowing cases is disclosed 
8 CGDWBP Whether a hotline and/or dedicated email for complaint is disclosed 
53  Overall Total of Corporate Governance Checklist Items 
Notation: CGDBD = Corporate Governance Disclosure on Board of Directors; CGDWBP = Corporate Governance 
Disclosure on Whistle Blowing policy; CGDRF = Corporate Governance Disclosure on Risk Framework 
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